Abstract
Introduction 1
Effective multilateralism is connected to a key document of the European Union (EU) -the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The strategy envisioned the creation of an "effective multilateral system" and set as an objective of the EU 2 the "development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order" (European Council 2003: 9) . At the heart of such an order would be cooperation and partnerships among states, supported and driven by the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations (IOs). Ideally, the web of these partnerships and international fora would increase the possibilities for finding solutions to global problems and threats.
The question we try to answer here is: How has the EU pursued effective multilateralism through its involvement in the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)?
The GCPCS was established in the peak of piracy attacks near Somalia. UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008:2-3) called for the establishment of "an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast." Although not formally a UN body, the Contact Group was formed in 2009 under this recommendation.
To study the case of the Contact Group, we rely on an interpretivist approach. We start by defining multilateralism and effective multilateralism. It should be underlined that we do not measure effectiveness, but rather examine how the CGPCS and EU's participation in it fit into a specific understanding of effective multilateralism. This is elaborated on in the section on methodology, case selection and data sources. We argue that EU pursued effective multilateralism through participating in and chairing the Contact Group, which collaborated with the UN and facilitated the dissemination of international norms.
The case of the CGPCS was chosen because the group is regarded as a unique international experiment.
Thus, an analysis of its activities could inspire innovative and creative solutions to international issues. It could also be indicative of the ability of the international community to work together. This is identified as a possible direction for future research in our concluding section. The conclusion also touches upon recent changes to the concept of effective multilateralism in the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS).
Literature Review and Definitions
Multilateralism's importance for the EU was reconfirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon. As per Article 21
(Treaty on European Union 2012), the EU "shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations" and "promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance". Thus, multilateralism appears to be connected to two key pursuits and principles of the EU. First, it could facilitate peace and security in the world, since conflict between like-minded and collaborating partners is less likely. Second, it could increase adherence to international norms through reliance on UN and other IOs.
Here, a definition of multilateralism is needed. We hold with John G. Ruggie's seminal claim that multilateralism can have both a nominal and a qualitative definition (1992) . Therefore, we accept that multilateralism involves the collaboration of three or more actors (both state and non-state), but that it also means "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalized" principles of conduct" (Ruggie 1992: 571) . This aligns with William Diebold's claim that even more important than the number of actors is the "kind of relationships that are instituted among them" (Ruggie 1995: 566) . Both the quantitative and the qualitative dimensions of multilateralism are taken into account in our analysis.
Relying on several scholars' influential works on multilateralism, Koops (2011: 67-68 ) distinguishes between traditional multilateralism as a "long-term organizing principle" and new multilateralism as a "shortterm threat response". He further concludes that EU's effective multilateralism "seeks to integrate the norms, rules, and institutions of 'traditional multilateralism'…with a more pragmatic, actively interventionist and even more military-geared culture akin to some form of output oriented 'new multilateralism'" (Koops 2011: 81) . An important observation could be made here. Due to the appearance of new actors and new threats, it is likely that EU's understanding of (effective) multilateralism is and will be changing.
This leads us to second needed definition -that of effective multilateralism as envisaged by the EU.
Based on literature on EU external action, Robert Kissack (2010: 17) identifies "four clusters of research" about what effective multilateralism is. In this paper, we adopt the approach characteristic of the third cluster, namely "looking at different spheres of multilateral activity and assessing EU performance by a set of project-wide measures" (Kissack 2010: 18) . This approach is pursued by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith, who argue that "(m)ultilateralism is both an institutional form and a policy objective (or principle)" as the term signifies the cooperation among states with and through IOs (2006: 5) . The authors also suggest three ways to define EU effectiveness -"EU effectiveness as an international actor,"
"EU effectiveness at the UN," and "EU contribution to the UN's effectiveness" (Laatikainen and Smith 2006:10) . Another observation about EU's effective multilateralism, which we rely on when discussing the CGPCS as an area of multilateral activity, is provided by Jan Wouters, Sijbren de Jong, and Philip De Man (2010) . On the grounds of major EU documents, they contend that effective multilateralism is "primarily as a form of governance that should produce noticeable effects whilst being embedded within strong, negotiated, and enforceable multilateral regimes" (2010: 15).
EU officials have contributed to the conceptualization of effective multilateralism. Some two years after the presentation of the ESS, Javier Solana, then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, praised effective multilateralism as a "highly successful" concept, but admitted that with the intensification of threats, it became "hard sell in practice" (Solana 2005). He also hinted that regional organizations are "natural allies" in the quest for effective multilateralism, although not all of them are worthy of the same level of EU support (Solana 2005).
In a speech about UN cooperation with regional organizations, the former High Representative Catherine
Ashton pointed out EU actions that could be placed under the umbrella of effective multilateralism. Ashton (2013) specified that the instruments of the EU's comprehensive approach, Europe's mediator role in international issues and its close work with various partners could be seen as manifestations of effective multilateralism.
As visible from EU documents and cited research, the UN provides an important framework for both the pursuit of effective multilateralism and its analysis. The EU envisions an increased role of the UN in international affairs and making its own voice heard in the UN environment. This is reminiscent of a question asked by Sven Biscop and Edith Drieskens (2006: 118) , namely "whether the EU has been successful in translating its support for the UN at the strategic level into policy practice". We are thus interested to see if in the case of CGPCS, the EU has utilized the tools, the resources and the forum of the UN to work towards reducing Somali piracy.
This is connected to a useful distinction by Kissack (2010: 20) between multilateralism as a means and as an end, which do not appear to be mutually exclusive. When an actor pursues multilateralism as an end, it encourages strengthening multilateral institutions and using them whenever possible. When an actor uses multilateralism as means, it works towards "formal and informal norms of behavior", trying to accomplish a concrete goal (Ibid.). Rules' embeddedness is a major component of the Effective
Multilateral Order, which Biscop and Renard (2012: 189-190) define as "an inclusive rule-based order, driven by cooperation, reciprocity and shared objectives, rather than by competition and zero-sum politics". The authors then assert that the EU could play a role in the construction of this order -as both a model and a leader -but to do that, it must be strategic, proactive and innovative (Biscop and Renard 2012: 193-194) .
Since its creation, the EU has tried to spread and support internationally certain norms. This has resulted in its seminal description as a normative power (Manners 2002) . The process of norms conception and promotion has been studied in detail by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) . According to them, there are norm entrepreneurs that may not benefit from a norm's emergence, but they nevertheless support the norm because they "believe in the ideals and values embodied in [it]" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 898) . In this sense, the pursuit of multilateralism, as both a means and an end, could be viewed as a way to disseminate norms within a community of actors.
Methodology, Sources and Selected Case
This case study is intended as an interpretive one. It does not seek a quantitative measurement of effectiveness. Instead, it examines how concrete activities of the CGPCS and EU's participation in them fit into the understanding of effective multilateralism discussed above. It does not aim to test a theory but to analyze the translation of an idea (that of effective multilateralism) into specific policies and initiatives. In this sense, we study the EU's contribution to a "multilateral activity" (Kissack 2010: 18) that is the Contact Group.
On the basis of studied literature and definitions provided by key EU documents, we identified three , press releases, reports and evaluation documents related to the Contact Group's activities and EU's participation. These texts present the focus of the CGPCS' activities, its approach, as well as some concrete results of its work. The group has been described as an example of informal or experimental governance and as an "innovative multi-stakeholder governance model" (EEAS n.d.), a "fluid network structure" (Zach, Seyle and Madsen 2013: 32). Christian Bueger identifies several elements that make the Group stand out from other similar contact groups: 1) there are no formal members, but stakeholders of different backgrounds;
2) the separation of the plenary from the working groups which guaranteed better focus on the separate issues and the birth of "transnational networks of experts"; 3) the extremely narrow and specific mandate of the Group; 4) the more 'relaxed' way of communication during the meetings that created "an experimental and creative atmosphere" (Bueger in Tardy ed. 2014: 80-81) . These features, some -more general, others -more specific, make the CGPCS an interesting subject of examination. The success of at least some of its initiatives would turn it into a model for future multilateral formations.
CGPCS -The Findings
The Scope of Involvement
The number of participants in any organization, coalition, etc. cannot be the single, sufficient indicator for their success. At the same time, the number of members is important because it enhances the legitimacy of the organization. An increase in membership could signify that more states adhere to an organization's ideas, rules, and recommendations. The same applies to the Contact Group we study.
While it is the final results that matter the most, we cannot disregard the number of actors that committed diplomatic, financial, consultancy and other resources to its work.
Immediately after the formation of CGPCS, two criteria for participation were set. 
Secretary General of the European External Action Service (EEAS). It is important to stress that
assuming the chairmanship is voluntary and does not follow a specific principle (regional, rotating, etc.).
The EU was invited to take the presidency by other CGPCS participants. According to EU's official position, chairing of the CGPCS would contribute to fulfilling one of its objectives: "zero ships and zero seafarers in the hands of Somali pirates" (Permanent Delegation of the EU to the UN Office 2013).
However, to achieve this, cooperation with the international community and the involvement of the regional states was needed.
After passing the chairmanship on to the Seychelles in 2016, the EU was reported to had accomplished successfully its main goals -the reform of the CGPCS, 8 the "zero-zero" priority and the documentation of the achievements (LLP) (European Commission and HRVP 2016: 6). There are two other points, which are even more important having in mind the topic of this paper. They were made in front of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense by Dr. Marcus Houben, Head of the support team of the EU chairmanship of the Contact Group. The first one is that the EU was the first organization to chair the group and it chaired it as 'One EU', which was a working principle from the start of the presidency (Houben 2015: 3) . This is a precedent which in the future could result in more and better possibilities for the EU to take on leadership and speak with one voice. The second argument made by Dr. Houben, concerns the multilateral nature of the Contact Group. He points out that the CGPCS is "a multi-stakeholder governance model for complex international problems" which "offers a context and environment that fits the EU surprisingly well" (Houben 2015: 6) . In essence, the EU is a multilateral environment trying to function and achieve results in another, larger, multilateral environment.
Taking into account the presence of a wide variety of actors, this environment also bears the characteristics of an epistemic community (Adler and Haas, 1992) . As Adler and Haas (1992: 389) claimed Hence, the extent of involvement of both the EU and other actors allows us to think of the CGPCS as a case of (effective) multilateralism. EU's chairmanship indicates that the EU is eager to get involved in multilateral mechanisms, to set priorities, influence the agenda, and assume the leadership position.
What Role for the UN?
We have identified as a second marker of effective multilateralism the role taken on by the UN as a consequence of the Contact Group's activities. Legitimacy is a suitable starting point for this section as well. The specific type of relation between the CGPCS and the UN has an element of legitimacy-bestowal and it works both ways. On one hand, CGPCS is legitimate since it was established on the basis of a UN Security Council Resolution on Somali piracy. On the other hand, the recommendations given by the Contact Group add weight to UN counter-piracy initiatives and activities. The reason is that these recommendations are product of discussions among states with significant stake and experience in the fight against piracy.
In this paper, we center on one particular output of the CGPCS, in which the UN came to play a essence is revealed in its very name -'multi-partner'. We believe that the decision to entrust the handling of funds and the implementation of projects to UN agencies is recognition of UN's trustworthiness.
Even if we discard trustworthiness as more of an intangible indicator, we could attribute the delegation of such duties to the UN's significant project management experience and bureaucratic capacity. While a comprehensive study of the Trust Fund could potentially expose some deficiencies, the Fund emerges as a good illustration of a multilateral initiative. This is supported by a statement made by the EU at the UN Security Council on Somali Piracy. The EU representative encourages states to continue their contributions to the Trust Fund and calls UNODCimplemented programs "an example of successful coordination and cooperation between the EU, the UN and regional countries", although recognizing that room for improvement exists (EU Delegation to the UN, n.d.). This observation is in line with EU's positioning of the UN at the core of its conception of a multilateral order.
With respect to the second identified marker, it is difficult to establish a direct link between EU's involvement in the CGPCS and the role of UN agencies as Trust Fund administrators and project beneficiaries. However, the fact that they were assigned with these responsibilities demonstrates that the resources and abilities of the UN are appreciated and utilized by its members and partners.
Norm Spreading
According to the 2015 Annual Report on the Trust Fund (2015: 11), one UNODC project focuses on guaranteeing prison conditions complying with international standards and human rights norms. This is a good starting point for the last proposed marker of multilateralism, namely the spread of international rules and norms. We argue that EU participated in the dissemination of certain norms through the CGPCS. In particular, we focus on norms contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and human rights standards.
UNCLOS itself is an attempt to regulate internationally sea-related matters. Interestingly enough, the EU is the only non-state actor to have ratified the Convention. This was done despite the fact that its
Member-States are also parties to UNCLOS. Thus, the EU is required and expected to abide by the principles of the Convention. They are enshrined in a number of key EU documents on maritime issues -for instance, the EU Maritime Security Strategy. There, the full compliance with UNCLOS, as well as human rights standards, other treaties, etc. is listed as a guiding principle of the strategy and referred to as essential for "rules-based good governance at sea" (Council of the European Union 2014:5). Joining international bodies and international treaties into domestic law is a distinctive form of norm appropriation. Another form of norm spreading is encouraging other actors to embrace the respective norm as well.
An immediate example of how the Contact Group led to the expansion of UNCLOS is related to the criminal prosecution of captured suspected pirates. Here, we cannot present in detail the discussions on finding of a suitable method for prosecution. Suffice it to say, numerous options for prosecution were considered within the CGPCS: international and regional mechanisms, a piracy tribunal, hybrid courts and informative SWOT Analysis of the Trust Fund. One of the strengths directly related to the Contact Group is that the Trust Fund enables it to "to take action via an effective funding and implementation mechanism" (2017:56). Most importantly for us, in order to prosecute the pirates, the Seychelles had to amend its Penal Code, namely to expand the section on the crime of piracy. The Seychelles incorporated Articles 101 to 107 of UNCLOS, 12 which essentially represents transfer of international legal norms into domestic law. For instance, the Code amendments involved the application of the universal jurisdiction principle. However, the Manual for Prosecutors (2015: 40) also reminded that "the application of the Universal Jurisdiction principle to acts of piracy does not mean that the 'normal' rules for maritime law enforcement, the use of force, and international human rights law do not apply".
Human rights standards concern the phenomenon of piracy in two ways. One of them encompasses the rights of suspected pirates, while the second one relates to the poor state of human rights in Somalia, aggravated by poverty, famine and humanitarian crisis. Here we are concerned with the first aspect, namely the rights that captured pirates are entitled to, among which right to free trial, prohibition of torture and cruel and inhumane treatment and capital punishment. agreements concluded between the EU and regional states. 13 As one of the main achievements of the CGPCS, the EU discerns the "functioning judicial and legal chain in the IO region to end the impunity of piracy", based on a "sophisticated web of actions, transfer and repatriation agreements" (EEAS 2014).
Discussions within the Contact Group facilitated the conclusion of these agreements.
Furthermore, the studied communiques make it clear that the agenda of CGPCS, and especially WG2, frequently included human rights considerations. For instance, at the 13 th plenary (December 2012), the Contact Group "encouraged WG 2 to develop best practices for ensuring the protection of human rights during the detention and prosecution". During the 14 th plenary (May 2013), the "CGPCS welcomed the thorough discussions of human rights issues in WG2 and the plans to share best practices in this field, including on how to handle children suspected of piracy". The analysed available summaries of the work of WG2 confirm that the issue of human rights was repeatedly discussed.
These developments demonstrate the CGPCS could be considered a multilateral formation that stimulated the spread of concrete definitions (piracy and universal jurisdiction) and standards (human rights). We believe that with respect to the third marker, the Contact Group clearly emerges as a case of effective multilateralism. It has served as a forum where internationally agreed rules and procedures were discussed, diffused and promoted.
Conclusion
The materials we used for this study are not sufficient to explore in detail EU's input into every activity of the Contact Group. However, this analysis of the nature and activities of the CGPCS allows us to describe it as a productive multilateral instrument. The active participation of the EU indicates its readiness to engage in multilateral solution-seeking initiatives. The environment created by CGPCS was utilized by the EU and other actors to discuss and propose counter-piracy actions. We also see the group as a formation that allows its participants to seek solutions, build alliances, fulfill interests, share experience and spread beliefs.
This paper does not claim to be comprehensive. Rather, we consider this a starting point for a more detailed research into the CGPCS, similar bodies, and state and non-state actors' participation in such bodies. It was our goal to examine how the work of the CGPCS and EU's participation in it fits into EU's vision of effective multilateralism. We consider EU's decision to enter the group and assume the presidency, as well as its input in initiatives that result from or are linked to the group's activities, as evidence for both the multilateral character of the CGPCS and the EU's pursuit of multilateral 13 As an example, see Art. 3(5), Art. 4(1), Art. 4(8) and Art. 5 of the "Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer." Link to the Agreement is provided in the List of References.
approaches. The Contact Group fits with the understanding of effective multilateralism supported here, as it actively collaborated with the UN and utilized its capacities, and facilitated the dissemination of international norms.
A major direction for future research concerns the changes that the concept of multilateralism is and will be going through within the EU. The 2016 EUGS has left out the attribute effective when talking about multilateralism, but continues to stress its primacy as a guiding principle for EU's external action.
However, the strategy also includes civil society representatives as potential partners in multilateral frameworks. It also talks about the "revamping" of external relations, of searching for "like-minded countries and regional groupings" (EUGS 2016:8) . In a recent speech to the UN Security Council, the current High Representative Federica Mogherini stated that the EU is "turning this commitment to multilateralism into practice, on a daily basis" (Mogherini 2016) . Recounting the work done by the EEAS in "different multilateral formats," she reminded that "(f)ormats can change, and institutions must be reformed" (Ibid.). This might be read as an attempt for greater flexibility of the multilateral approach, which takes into account the specificities of any situation and actors involved.
The increasing scope and altered nature of global threats suggest a difficult path ahead for international cooperation efforts. However, cases like that of the CGPCS raise hopes that the international community is still capable of finding creative, innovative and productive solutions to global problems.
